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Rising economic inequality in the United States has become a topic of 
political interest in recent years. Inequality appears to show cycles 
corresponding to secular cycles, suggesting the possibility of 
declining inequality in the future. The most recent episode of 
declining inequality in America is known as the Great Compression. 
It occurred in the middle of the twentieth century. This paper uses 
the guided variation cultural evolution model (Boyd and Richerson 
1985: 95–97) to explain shifting trends in inequality in five nations. 
According to this analysis, the Great Compression was largely due to 
a shift in the business environment reflecting tax and other economic 
policy implemented over the 1914–45 era. The cultural evolutionary 
response to this environmental change was to replace “shareholder 
primacy” cultural variants with “stakeholder capitalism” variants, 
which resulted in lower inequality. Half a century later, new policy, 
implemented in response to the great inflation following the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system, changed the business environment 
again in ways that favored shareholder primacy cultural variants and 
rising inequality. The extent to which this occurred depended on the 
degree to which stakeholder capitalism was integrated into 
institutions. 
Introduction 
Rising economic inequality and political polarization in the United States has 
become a topic of political interest in recent years (Drutman 2017; Florida 2018; 
Teachout 2017). According to structural-demographic theory, rising economic 
inequality generates rising elite number, which is a major cause of political 
polarization and rising sociopolitical instability (Turchin 2013). These variables, 
and others, tend to rise and fall in concert, defining secular cycles (Turchin and 
Nefedov 2009: 5). Recently a comprehensive assessment of long-term trends in 
more than eight social variables was used to define a consensus American secular 
cycle (Turchin 2016: 247). Figure 1 presents this cycle and compares it to an 
empirical measure of economic inequality over time, showing a close correspond-
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dence between the two. Piketty (2014: 316–17) describes inequality waves in 
Australia, Britain and Canada that are approximately aligned with the one in the 
US. After 1980, inequality rose in tandem in all three countries, reaching a more or 
 
 
Figure 1. Trends in economic inequality since 1800. Two measures of inequality 
were used. The first is elite fraction (𝐸𝐹) defined as the fraction of GDP that does 
not go to workers (1 − 𝑊𝑆%). 𝑊𝑆% is the product of annual wage multiplied by 
labor force/population (𝐿𝐹/𝑁), fraction employed (1 − 𝑢) and the fraction that 
were free (1 − 𝑆%) plus the employer contribution to social security and pensions 
(𝑆𝑆%). Wage was 1.61 times unskilled wage (Officer and Williamson 2015). GDP 
was obtained from Johnston and Williamson (2016). 𝐿𝐹 after 1947 was obtained 
from the Labor Department. Between 1900 and 1947 𝐿𝐹 was obtained from the 
Census Bureau (1975) and for 1800–1900 from Lebergott (1966). Unemployment 
rate (𝑢) was obtained from Vernon (1994) for 1869–99, Lebergott (1964) for 
1900–1947 and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.) after 1947. Before 1869 it was 
set at 4%. Slave number/population (𝑆%) was obtained from Bourne (2008). 
Employer contributions to Social Security and pensions were obtained from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (n.d.). The second measure was the top 1% wealth 
share (Williamson and Lindert 1980) before 1913 and a combination of top 1% 
income share (WID n.d.) and top 1% wealth share (Saez and Zucman 2016; WID 
n.d.) after 1913. Inequality in 1913 was set equal to 𝐸𝐹. Before 1913 the change in 
inequality was a weighted geometric average of the change in 𝐸𝐹 and the change 
in the top 1% fraction of wealth (Williamson and Lindert 1980), with a weighting 
of 4 applied to 𝐸𝐹. After 1913 it was a weighted average of the change in 𝐸𝐹, top 
1% income and top 0.1% wealth with a weighting of 6 for 𝐸𝐹. The index was 
smoothed with an exponential average (see supplemental data). The purpose of 
the weighting was to make 𝐸𝐹 responsible for approximately half of the change 
over time. 
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less stable, higher value in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This rise was 
followed by a surge in sociopolitical instability in America (Turchin 2016) Britain 
and elsewhere in the world (Ortmans et al. 2017: 143, 147–48).  
 Secular cycles have been most thoroughly characterized in preindustrial 
agrarian states and empires (Alexander 2016; Baker 2011; Korotayev et al 2006; 
Turchin and Nefedov 2009). Jack Goldstone (1991) developed demograph ic 
structural theory (DST) to explain the linkage between economic inequality and 
increased intra-elite competition, which led to conflict between elites, often result-
ing in state breakdown in agrarian polities. Mathematical versions of DST that 
generate secular cycles in population, inequality, elite number and political 
instability have been developed (Turchin 2003, 2013; Turchin and Korotayev 
2006). Turchin’s (2016) structural-demographic theory (SDT), used to model the 
American secular cycle, draws upon this preindustrial theory, as described below. 
Overview of Secular Cycle Theory 
The fundamental driver of the agrarian secular cycle is population growth relative 
to amount of arable land. As the land becomes fully occupied, agricultural 
employment reaches a maximum. Further population growth creates labor 
oversupply relative to a fixed demand for agricultural labor and real wages fall. 
Falling wages means a larger share of the economic pie goes to landowning elites, 
who flourish and see their numbers grow. With rising numbers, intra-elite 
competition rises, eventually leading to political instability. These instability-
breeding social forces are tracked by PSI, the political stress indicator (Goldstone 
1991: 141–45; Turchin 2013). High levels of PSI trigger a political crisis, often 
involving state breakdown, civil war or revolution, which may initiate a sustained 
decline in economic inequality, after which a new secular cycle begins. 
 SDT holds that this basic demographic mechanism still applies to post-agrarian 
polities like the United States. The role of arable land in an agricultural economy is 
replaced with a labor demand function which is externally specified, either as a 
simple exponential function (Turchin 2016: 153) or as GDP divided by a measure 
of labor productivity (Turchin 2016: 212). If the labor force grows faster than 
demand for labor, then real wages fail to keep up with economic growth and 
inequality rises. According to this model, the inequality trend reversal in the early 
twentieth century reflected the reduction in immigration after 1924, which caused 
a reduction in labor supply, leading to faster wage growth and falling inequality. 
 This idea is not compatible with standard economic theory, which holds that 
growth in GDP is largely determined by investment. Firms increase investment and 
hire workers when business is good (consumer demand is strong). Since workers 
are also consumers, demand (and consequently, investment) should grow with 
employment, provided rising GDP per worker translates into higher incomes for 
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workers. That is, increased employment leads to increased aggregate demand, 
increased investment and further demand for labor, leading to more employment 
in a virtuous cycle. There should be no limitation on GDP expansion as long as the 
fruits of economic activity are shared between workers/consumers and own-
ers/managers. Such sharing is necessarily the case when inequality is low. Thus 
rising inequality caused by the mechanism described by Turchin should not occur 
in an post-agrarian economy starting out from a condition of relative equality such 
as the 1970s (see Figure 1), yet it did. 
 Alexander (2017) proposed a non-demographic mechanism for rising 
inequality based on Thomas Piketty’s (2014) hypothesis that the rate of wealth 
growth relative to economic growth drives inequality. Wealth was represented by 
an abstract portfolio consisting of stocks and bonds, which was divided by wage to 
provide an oscillator that reveals the relative success of the investor class versus 
the working class. In a capitalist society, the investing class can be considered as a 
proxy for elites. This oscillator showed that the cyclical trends in the relative 
financial well-being of elites served as a good proxy for inequality. Alexander 
proposed that a feedback effect of inequality on economic performance brought 
about a “capitalist crisis” denoted by a sharp decline in a proxy measure of “capital 
productivity” (GDP per unit capital), which led to the 1929 stock market crash and 
Great Depression. Application of a simplified version of Turchin’s PSI shows 
political stress peaking in 1929, after which policy was enacted that produced the 
inequality trend reversal.  
 Turchin (2016: 34) identifies cultural factors such as social mood that may play 
an important role in inequality trend reversals in secular cycles. He describes how, 
along with immigration restriction, a coalition of elites “implemented a series of 
formal reforms, supplemented by a number of informal measures” that reversed 
the preexisting trends in inequality and well-being (Turchin 2016: 171). This 
article presents a cultural evolution model for how policies taken in response to 
the capitalist crisis produced falling inequality in the mid-twentieth century and 
how a later policy change reversed this trend in the 1970s (see Figure 1). The 
model is explicitly developed for the American experience, but it is then applied to 
a number of European countries to identify commonalities and differences 
between European and American inequality/secular cycles. 
Theoretical Development 
How income is divided between rich and poor in an industrial capitalist society is 
presumed to result from the collective beliefs and economic behavior of business 
executives, that is, business culture. In the simple analysis presented here, business 
culture is treated as a mixture of two cultural variants. The first variant, 
“shareholder primacy” (SP) was asserted by economic and legal scholar Adolf Berle 
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in 1931: “all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corpora-
tion … [are] at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the share-
holders as their interest appears.” The second variant was asserted in response to 
Berle by Harvard law professor E. Merrick Dodd (1932), who noted that “there is 
in fact a growing feeling not only that business has responsibilities to the 
community but that our corporate managers who control business should 
voluntarily and without waiting for legal compulsion manage it in such a way as to 
fulfill those responsibilities.” He argued for “a view of the business corporation as 
an economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making 
function.” That is, a corporation has a responsibility to stakeholders other than 
shareholders, a view that may be called “stakeholder capitalism” (SC). 
 This debate was an open issue at the end of the twenties boom. Two decades 
after his 1931 article, Berle acknowledged that it had been resolved in favor of 
stakeholder capitalism: 
Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late 
Professor E. Merrick Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding 
that corporate powers were powers in trust for shareholders while 
Professor Dodd argued that these powers were held in trust for the 
entire community. The argument has been settled (at least for the 
time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention. (Berle 
1954: 169) 
 SC was apparently still in force as late as 1981, as indicated by this statement 
from the Business Roundtable: 
Corporations have a responsibility, first of all, to make available to the 
public quality goods and services at fair prices, thereby earning a 
profit that attracts investment to continue and enhance the 
enterprise, provide jobs, and build the economy. The long-term 
viability of the corporation depends upon its responsibility to the 
society of which it is a part. And the well-being of society depends 
upon profitable and responsible business enterprises. (quoted in 
Yang 2013) 
Sixteen years later the Business Roundtable was asserting that the principal 
objective of a business enterprise is “to generate economic returns to its owners” 
(in Yang 2013). Business philosophy had come back full circle to Berle’s 1931 
position. These changing views of the purpose of a corporation illustrate how 
business culture changed from primarily SP around 1930 to SC during the 1950s 
through the 1970s, and then back to SP after 1981. The timing of these cultural 
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shifts corresponds to the timing of inequality trend reversals around 1930 and 
1980 (see Figure 1), suggesting a relationship between the two. 
 A primary role for executives is capital allocation, deciding how retained 
earnings should be deployed to produce the maximum return. The SC manager sees 
return as capital growth; earnings are invested to generate more capital in order to 
achieve a maximum rate of capital accumulation. This results in enterprise growth 
and job creation, which increases labor bargaining power and acts as a force for 
lower inequality. The SP manager sees return as financial (dollars per unit capital). 
If he can find a financial asset that delivers a higher financial return than business 
enterprise, he will purchase that asset instead. Doing this means less growth and 
less demand for workers, and acts as a force for rising inequality. 
 Median real return on capital (ROC) in American corporations has run at about 
5.5% over the long run (Jiang and Koller 2006). During long bull markets it is 
sometimes possible to capture gains higher than ROC, of which an SP manager 
might take advantage. Over 1980–2017, average real capital gains have been 5.5%, 
the same as ROC. They were higher (c. 9%) during the 1980–2000 bull market era. 
Since 1982, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has permitted 
corporate stock buybacks, which in recent decades have been substantial, as 
reported by Lazonick (2014): 
Consider the 449 companies in the S&P 500 index that were publicly 
listed from 2003 through 2012. During that period those companies 
used 54% of their earnings—a total of $2.4 trillion—to buy back their 
own stock, almost all through purchases on the open market. 
Dividends absorbed an additional 37% of their earnings. That left 
very little for investments in productive capabilities. 
Clearly, most executive investment behavior today is consistent with SP culture. 
 Prior to 1982 stock buybacks were not permitted, but even if they had been, 
they would not have made financial sense from an SP standpoint. From the 1942 
stock market bottom to 1980, average real capital gains on the S&P 500 stock index 
averaged 2.7%, half the return on capital. Even during the 1950–70 bull market 
era, the price trend was less than 5.5% in real terms. The financial environment 
encouraged executives to invest as SC managers and focus on building great 
corporations rather than high stock prices. 
 The two cultures also differ on how they view workers. SP business culture sees 
workers as costs to be managed in order to maximize shareholder value and 
achieve great wealth for the executives who run the corporations. An illustration 
of this share-value-centric view of workers as liabilities is the favorable short-term 
positive stock market response to announcements of layoffs due to corporate 
restructuring (Hahn and Reyes 2004). Restructuring implies that the laid-off 
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workers were not necessary for achievement of bottom line results and so were 
financial liabilities. Their elimination should boost earnings and this perception 
drives share prices higher. In contrast, SC managers see workers as assets to be 
deployed in their quest to achieve business greatness. 
 Through its investing behavior and stance towards employees, the evolution of 
business culture generates inequality trends as a side effect of the type of business 
management and state economic policy prescribed by the business culture. This 
article uses economic inequality as a proxy for business culture, in which the 
relative amount of SP to SC is assumed to be directly related to inequality: higher 
inequality means more SP; lower means more SC.  
 Cultural change will be characterized with the guided variation model (Boyd 
and Richerson 1985: 95–98), which combines the effects of cultural transmission 
and individual learning. Cultural transmission is assumed to occur by businessmen 
copying those of their peers who are perceived as successful. Which peers to copy 
is indicated by symbolic markers. One of these is wealth, or as CNN founder Ted 
Turner is reported to have said, “life’s a game, money is how we keep score” 
(Brainyquote n.d.). Another is social prestige, which arises from the importance of 
the enterprise the executive runs as perceived by the larger society. The leader of 
a great corporation would serve as a prestige-based model, while an oil magnate 
or tech billionaire might serve as a wealth-based model. 
 Achieving great wealth or prestige makes the achiever a model for emulation 
by other businessmen and results in the spread of the achiever’s culture. Which 
model is adaptive determines the direction of inequality trends. When executive 
compensation is strong there will be many very rich executives who can serve as 
cultural models. And when compensation tracks financial performance, SP 
managers focused on financial performance will tend to be richer than growth-
centric SC managers and so comprise a disproportionate share of those possessing 
the wealth symbolic marker. Under conditions in which financial markets are 
strong, SP managers can exploit an acquisition strategy to build great companies 
and acquire the prestige marker, beating out SC managers employing a slower 
organic-growth strategy. Under conditions of strong executive compensation and 
strong stock market performance, SP culture-holders will produce more “cultural 
offspring,” SP prevalence will rise, and inequality with it.  
 On the other hand, when executive compensation is weak there will be fewer 
very rich executives and fewer models identifiable by the wealth marker. 
Furthermore, if compensation does not follow financial performance, those 
following SP will get no richer than those who do not and so enjoy no cultural 
transmission advantage. Weak stock markets make it harder for SP managers to 
pursue an acquisition strategy to acquire the prestige symbolic marker. On the 
other hand, those following SC will be undeterred by lower profit margins and 
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weak markets in their quest to build bigger business empires. They will achieve 
greater prestige via organic-growth strategies that have less appeal to their SP 
peers and so have correspondingly greater cultural reproductive success. In this 
case, SC is adaptive, its prevalence in the population would grow, and inequality 
fall. 
 An illustration of which culture led to the greater prestige in the 1950s is 
provided by President Eisenhower. Eisenhower appointed General Motors CEO 
Charles Wilson as his Secretary of Defense. During his confirmation hearings, when 
asked if he could make a decision as Secretary that would be adverse to the 
interests of General Motors, Wilson answered affirmatively. But he then added that 
he could not conceive of such a situation “because for years I thought what was 
good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa” (quoted in 
Terrell 2016). Only a stakeholder capitalist manager, who sees himself as a 
steward for multiple stakeholders (i.e. society), would make a statement like this. 
An SP manager would accept as a matter of course that the shareholder interests 
he promotes are often at odds with the interests of the larger society. In contrast, 
this is what Eisenhower had to say about extremely rich oil magnates (and 
presumed SP cultural models) in a 1954 letter to his brother: 
There is a tiny splinter group, of course, that believes you can do these 
things [abolish the New Deal]. Among them are H. L. Hunt (you 
possibly know his background), a few other Texas oil millionaires, 
and an occasional politician or business man from other areas. Their 
number is negligible and they are stupid. 
Because the initial motivation for capitalist entrepreneurship is to achieve a 
financial return (i.e. get rich), financially orientated SP culture is the default during 
the early stages of capitalist development, when most firms are run by their 
founders or their heirs. The cause of a shift from SP to SC is a disruption in the 
normal functioning of capitalism that gives rise to a new business environment 
that makes financially based strategies less reproductively effective and organic-
growth-based strategies more so. The Crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great 
Depression was such a disruption. It is likely not a coincidence that the journal 
articles defining the SP and SC cultural paradigms were published when they were. 
The business environment changed radically after 1929 in ways that made SC 
adaptive, as is described in the next section. 
Which Environmental Changes Lead to Changing Business Culture? 
Until about 1900 most large firms were run by their owners and so executive and 
shareholder interests were the same. In this situation SP is always favored. 
Business consolidation in the late nineteenth century and afterward resulted in the  
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Figure 2. Trends in top tax rate and executive earnings. Data from Frydman and 
Saks (2008) and Wells (2011), adjusted to 2000 basis using GDP per capita. 
 
formation of giant corporations that increasingly required professional business 
management. Initially, executives were paid fixed salaries like any other employee, 
but boards came to realize that a salaried employee would never display the same 
degree of care and energy as an owner unless they had some incentive to do so. 
Thus, they started to pay bonuses for performance (Wells 2011).  
 With the onset of income taxes in 1913, the marginal cost of executive 
compensation relative to shareholders is given by: 
Marginal Cost = (1 − 𝑇𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝 / (1 − 𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑑)   (1) 
where 𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑑  and 𝑇𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝  refer to the top individual and corporate tax rates. Marginal 
cost is the amount of after-tax earnings sacrificed in order to provide an extra 
dollar of after-tax executive compensation. Very high values of marginal cost would 
be expected to discourage high levels of executive compensation. 
 Initially, the marginal cost of executive compensation was modest; it averaged 
about 1.2 over 1913–31, excluding the period of extraordinary World War I 
taxation. Furthermore, about half of this period fell into the economic and stock 
market boom of the 1920s, during which share owners and their managers did 
very well. So we can assume that the business paradigm was largely SP in 1929, as 
implied by the high level of inequality then (see Figure 1).  
 Individual tax rates went up to high levels in 1932 and remained there for 
nearly fifty years. The marginal cost of executive compensation rose to an average 
value of 3.7 over 1933–80 (5.2 over 1937–63). It made little sense (particularly 
over 1937–63) to provide high executive compensation, as tax policy had made it 
very expensive. This new environment of high-cost executive compensation was 
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associated with a lagging trend towards lower levels of executive compensation 
that lasted until the 1970s (see Figure 2). After 1980, tax policy changed again and 
the marginal cost of executive compensation fell dramatically to an average of 
$1.05 over 1981–2016, creating an environment in which paying high levels of 
executive compensation was cheaper than it had ever been since the beginning of 
income tax. 
 Higher taxes would be expected to affect stock market values. During the 1930–
80 period of high taxes and rising SC (as indicated by falling inequality), the stock 
market was valued about 30% lower than during the adjacent periods. For 
example, the ratio of the S&P 500 index to GDP per capita showed average values 
of 2.17, 1.54 and 2.42 during 1871–1930, 1931–80 and 1981–2017, respectively. 
Further evidence of low-valued financial markets during the 1933–80 period was 
the absence of asset bubbles or associated market crashes and financial panics. 
Compare this absence with (in the pre-1933 period) the three panics in 1873, 1893 
and 1907 and the 1929 crash, and (in the post-1980 era) the 1987 crash, 2000 tech 
bubble and 2008 panic. 
 In an environment of tax-constrained compensation and lackluster stock 
values, gaining great wealth was very hard. Capable pursuit of financial 
performance as called for by SP culture would not necessarily lead to great wealth, 
while the depressed market meant that SP managers’ bottom-line focus did not 
translate into high stock valuations, preventing an acquisition strategy to buy the 
size that led to prestige. Prestige could still be gained through aggressive organic-
growth strategies intended to grow large and important corporations. Such 
strategies required firms to focus strongly on hiring when demand picked up, and 
to maintain some slack in their workforce when the economy was weak in order to 
respond quickly to opportunities when they arrived. This necessarily meant higher 
labor costs. Such strategies would be eschewed by SP managers focused on the 
bottom line, who would achieve greater profitability, but when compensation did 
not follow they would not acquire the wealth symbolic marker. Meanwhile, SC 
managers, more willing to sacrifice financial performance for growth, would out-
expand them, gaining market share and economies of scale that put them at a 
functional advantage relative to their SP peers in the competition for prestige. In a 
world of high taxes and depressed stock values, SC culture would prove adaptive. 
 An organic-growth paradigm that evolved in response to a high-tax 
environment should result in a stronger demand for labor, which would lead to 
increased labor bargaining power. Figure 3 provides support for this idea: growth 
in labor power, as measured by annual number of strikes, tended to increase with 
higher top tax rate. Other factors affected union activity besides taxation. Table 1 
shows a statistically significant correlation (𝑝 < 0.037) between which party holds 
executive power and the rate of strike growth. The different trends during these 
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eras mostly reflected how the executive branch responded to labor-management 
conflicts, with Democratic administrations more sympathetic to the union side and 
Republican administrations more sympathetic towards management. For example, 
strike activity was largely flat during the 1896–1912 period of Republican rule. The 
inequality measure in Figure 1 rose 11% over this period. Strike activity rose 
strongly during the subsequent Democratic administration over 1912–20, with a 
  
 
Figure 3. Higher tax rate promotes labor activity measured by strikes per year. 
Strike frequency is an exponential average (𝛼 = 0.05) of change in annual strike 
number. Strike data was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.) for the 
period after 1947 and from Mitchell (1998) for the period before. 
 
 
Figure 4. US Inequality compared to a 50–50 stock–bond portfolio value/wage. 
Stock market returns calculated from data from Shiller (n.d.). Bond returns 
obtained from a AAA corporate bond yield series (Federal Reserve) back to 1913 
and before that from a series from Macauley (1938). Shown is the ratio of this 
portfolio value relative to wage with the value in 1871 set equal to 1. Inflation rate 
is a trailing five-year average normalized to fall into a min–max range of 2 to 8. 
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Table 1. Trends in strike frequency with changing administrations 1896–2008. 
Period Admin. 
Strike 
Trend* 
(%/yr) 
Period Admin. 
Strike 
Trend* 
(%/yr) 
1896–1912 Republican –0.2 1968–1976 Republican −3.9% 
1912–1920 Democratic +5.5 1976–1980 Democratic −6.7% 
1920–1932 Republican −1.6 1980–1992 Republican −1.6% 
1932–1952 Democratic +3.0 1992–2000 Democratic −0.3% 
1952–1960 Republican −4.3 2001–2008 Republican −0.2% 
1960–1968 Democratic +6.8 2009–2016 Democratic +0.1 
Republican Average −2.0    
Democratic Average +3.1    
*Values are slope of a log regression of strike frequencies over the corresponding 
period. 
 
12% decline in inequality. During the next 12 years of Republican administrations, 
strike activity fell and by 1928 inequality had recovered everything it had lost and 
a bit more. 
 The next twenty years under Democratic presidents shifted relations in favor 
of labor, with the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 and pro-worker economic 
policy during World War II (Alexander 2017). The Wagner Act created the National 
Labor Relations Board, the members of which were appointed by the executive 
branch. The board became a major vehicle through which these political biases 
were expressed, which is shown by the large swings in strike activity seen mid-
century (see Table 1). The step increase in labor power enabled by the New Deal 
meant executives frequently had to accommodate union demands. SC managers, 
with their multi-stakeholder point of view, would have an edge over SP managers 
in finding a modus vivendi with labor, aiding them in their quest for greater 
prestige.  
 Another factor affecting the business environment was government interest-
rate policy. From 1871 to the business cycle peak in 1929, real long-term interest 
rates had averaged 4.1% (Officer 2018; Officer and Williamson 2018). After the 
collapse of the economy and the inauguration of the New Deal, monetary policy 
changed so that from the 1937 business cycle peak to the 1981 cycle peak, real 
rates averaged only 0.7%. After 1980, real interest rates rose again to an average 
value of 4.3% through 2017. Lower rates are stimulatory, and average real per 
capita GDP growth rates reflected this: 1.7% for the first period, 2.8% for the latter 
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and 1.8% for the third. This stronger growth potential also aided the organic-
growth strategies called for by SC culture. 
 Finally, inflation can affect inequality. Figure 4 shows a plot of the cumulative 
return on a hypothetical American investment portfolio relative to wage gains. This 
portfolio consists of 50% bonds and 50% stocks. Figure 4 shows how three periods 
of elevated inflation impacted financial returns in America. The impact of WWI 
inflation on portfolio value was very great. This experience was an important 
factor in generating political support for high taxes and price controls to deal with 
the inflation potential anticipated to come from WWII (Alexander 2017). 
The Guided Variation Model 
The guided variation model, which is a combination of cultural transmission and 
individual learning, is described by the following expressions: 
𝑋𝑗+1 = 𝑎𝑋𝑗 + (1 − 𝑎)𝐸     (2) 
𝑎 = 𝑉𝐸/(𝐿 + 𝑉𝐸)      (3) 
Here 𝑋 refers to the prevalence of the cultural attribute undergoing evolution. In 
this case it is the prevalence of SP concepts in the business paradigms used to 
operate the economy. 𝐸 stands for the objective of the learning model individuals 
use to guide behavior in the current environment. That is, it is the individuals’ best 
guess of the 𝑋 value appropriate for (i.e. fully adapted to) the current business 
environment. As noted above, economic inequality will be used as a proxy for 
fraction SP, so 𝑋 and 𝐸 are expressed in terms of some measure of economic 
inequality. 𝐿 refers to the propensity of executives as a whole to rely on their 
personal experience (individual learning) as opposed to following what others do 
(i.e. cultural transmission) and 𝑉𝐸  refers to the variance of the error between an 
individual’s assessment of 𝐸 and its correct value.  
 In a version of the “wisdom of crowds,” individual learning is assumed to get 
the correct result of 𝐸 on average. Individual learners will typically get it wrong to 
some degree. 𝑉𝐸  measures the size of the error. When 𝑉𝐸  is large relative to 𝐿, there 
is greater risk an individual will get it wrong and fail. In this case, executive strategy 
will rely more on established precedent and what industry leaders are doing and 
less on personal experience. The parameter 𝑎 will be close to one and executive 
practice will only slowly converge onto the optimal strategy for the current 
environment. If 𝑉𝐸  is small relative to 𝐿, the individual risk is small, most will rely 
on their own insight, and 𝑎 will be small. In this case executive practice (culture) 
will quickly adopt the optimum behavior for the current environment—that is, 𝑋 
will rapidly converge to 𝐸. 
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 The model is structured so that, every year, executives collectively take stock of 
their experiences in the current environment (individual learning) plus what they 
already know or have learned from observing what their peers do (cultural 
transmission) to adjust their practices and so transform their old practices/culture 
in year k (𝑋𝑘) into their new ones in the next year (𝑋𝑘+1).  
Results 
The guided variation model developed here uses the top 1% income share as the 
measure of 𝑋 and 𝐸 in equation 1. The business environment 𝐸 is assumed to be a 
function of the variables suggested to be important cultural determinants by the 
arguments made above, such as top tax rate (𝑇), union activity as measured by 
strike frequency (𝑆), real interest rate (𝑅𝐼) and inflation (𝐼).  
𝐸 = 𝐶 − 𝑘𝑇 − 𝑚𝑆 − 𝑛𝑅𝐼 − 𝑞𝐼    (4) 
Here 𝐶, 𝑘, 𝑚, 𝑛 and 𝑞 are adjustable constants and 𝐸 is the top 1% income share 
consistent with the current business environment. Equation 4 is then substituted 
into equation 2 to yield: 
𝑋𝑗+1 = 𝑎𝑋𝑗 + (1 − 𝑎)(𝐶 − 𝑘𝑇𝑗+1 − 𝑚𝑆𝑗+1 − 𝑛𝑅𝐼𝑗+1 − 𝑞𝐼𝑗+1) (5) 
As noted earlier, prior to 1913 there were no income taxes and the culture was 
necessarily SP. It follows that business culture was necessarily adapted to the 
existing business environment in 1913. This means that in 1913 (“year zero” of this 
analysis) 𝑋0 = 𝐸0 and 
𝑋0 = 𝐶 − 𝑘𝑇0 − 𝑚𝑆0 − 𝑛𝑅𝐼0 − 𝑝𝐼0    (6) 
It then follows from equation 5 that 
                 𝑋1 = 𝐶 − 𝑘[𝑎𝑇0 + (1 − 𝑎)𝑇1] − 𝑚[𝑎𝑆0 + (1 − 𝑎)𝑆1] − 
𝑛[𝑎𝑅0 + (1 − 𝑎)𝑅1] − 𝑞[𝑎𝐼0 + (1 − 𝑎)𝐼1]   (7) 
The terms in the brackets are the first terms of an exponential average of 𝑇, 𝑆, 𝑅 
and 𝐼. Noting this, equation 5 can be written as 
𝑋𝑗 = 𝐶 − 𝑘𝐸𝐴𝑗(𝑎, 𝑇) − 𝑚𝐸𝐴𝑗(𝑎, 𝑆) − 𝑛𝐸𝐴𝑗(𝑎, 𝑅) − 𝑞𝐸𝐴𝑗(𝑎, 𝐼)     (8) 
where 𝐸𝐴𝑗(𝑎, 𝑦) is the exponential average of an annual series of 𝑦 values from 
year 0 to year j with constant 𝑎. 
 In accordance with equation 8, running exponential averages of 𝑇, 𝑆 and 𝐼 
values were made and various combinations of them regressed versus top 1% 
income share (𝑋’s). In each case, parameter 𝑎 was adjusted to give the best fit. 
Single environmental variable regressions showed that strike frequency gave the 
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best fit (𝑟2 = 0.79) and tax rates were next (𝑟2 = 0.68). When inflation was 
combined with taxes, 𝑟2 increased to 0.73. The best fit was achieved with a 
combination of strikes and taxes (𝑟2 = 0.83). Using three environmental variables 
gave no improvement over strikes + taxes. 
 The adjustable parameters for the best fit (see Figure 5) were 𝑎 = 0.92, 𝐶 =
23.7, 𝑘 = 0.07 and 𝑚 = 0.12. The evolving business culture over time is character-
ized by the plot of the top 1% income share. The dotted line shows a plot of the 
inequality level (business culture) consistent with the current business 
environment (𝐸), which was obtained from equation 4 using the parameter values 
determined above. The predicted value of inequality/business culture (𝑋) 
resulting from cultural evolution was obtained from these 𝐸 values using equation 
2 with 𝑎 = 0.92. 
 From equation 2, the value for 𝑎 of 0.92 implies that 𝑉𝐸  is 11.5 times larger than 
𝐿. Business is hard, and practitioners need to rely heavily on social learning 
(observing what others are doing) and not just their own experience. As a result, it 
took decades for the business culture (and the economy) to fully adapt to 
significant changes in economic policy such as the New Deal-era tax increases and 
the Reagan-era tax cuts. 
 
 
Figure 5. Cultural evolution model applied to the US 1913–2014. Model para-
meters: 𝑎 = 0.92, 𝐶 = 23.7, taxes (𝑘) = 0.07, strikes (𝑚) = 0.12; real interest rate = 
0; inflation = 0. Top 1% income share from WID (n.d.). 
Results for European Countries 
An analogous analysis was done for the UK. Top 1% income share data for the early 
twentieth century is fairly sparse, while there is a fair amount of top 1% wealth-
share data available for this period. Income and wealth-share data are highly  
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Figure 6. Cultural evolution model applied to the UK 1895–2014. Model para- 
meters: 𝑎 = 0.94, 𝐶 = 23.5, taxes = 0.185. Top 1% income share from WID (n.d.). 
Tax rates from Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (n.d.). Inflation from Clark (2019). Interest 
rates from Officer (2018). Strike data from UK Office for National Statistics (2015). 
 
 
Figure 7. Cultural evolution model applied to Sweden 1903–2014. Model para- 
meters: 𝑎 = 0.90, 𝐶 = 21.7, taxes = 0.22. Top 1% income share from WID (n.d.). 
Tax rates from Stenkula et al. (2014). Inflation data from Edvinsson and Söderberg 
(n.d.).  
 
correlated over the 1919–57 period (𝑟2 = 0.98) and the regression equation 
between them was used to estimate income share for years in which wealth share, 
but not income share, was available. The two types of data are plotted in Figure 6, 
where it can be seen that they closely agree with each other. The combined dataset 
was used to screen the same sort of variables as was done for the US case. The best 
single-variable correlation (𝑟2 = 0.98) was with tax rates. Adding strike activity, 
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real interest rate or inflation as variables did not improve the fit at all. Figure 6 
shows the excellent fit obtained with this single-variable model. 
 Figure 7 presents top 1% income share data for Sweden. Here good data exist 
from 1910 to the present. Inequality trends were again well represented using only 
top tax rate to characterize the business/economic environment (𝑟2 = 0.90). 
Adding inflation as a second variable did not improve the fit. Neither strike nor real 
interest-rate data was available so the effect of these variables could not be 
ascertained. Tax rates also did a good job of explaining income inequality trends in 
France (𝑟2 = 0.88), as shown in Figure 8. Neither inflation nor real interest-rate 
nor strike data were available for the entire period so no further analysis could be 
done. 
 Tax rate alone did not do as good of a job of explaining inequality trends in 
Germany as it did for the other European countries. Neither strike data nor interest 
rates nor a complete inflation series was available. Because tax + inflation had 
improved the US fit over just taxes and Germany had historical experience with 
extreme inflation, an attempt was made to incorporate inflation into the analysis 
of German inequality as best as possible. 
 Consumer price series over 1924–40 and 1956 to present were available. I 
constructed a crude inflation measure using several wholesale price series 
available at NBER Macrohistory Database (2001) to obtain an inflation trend over 
1900–22. Prices rose several billionfold in 1923 (Hetzel 2002). Introducing a semi-
infinite spike in the inflation series would prevent its use. As it turned out, a 
number of the wholesale series did not show large price increases reflecting the 
1923 hyperinflation and so the composite measure I calculated gave a 1923 
inflation rate of around 700% in place of a semi-infinite spike. I used this value for 
1923 inflation. The missing data between 1941 and 1955 were analyzed in two  
 
Figure 8. Cultural evolution model applied to France 1910–2014. Model para- 
meters: 𝑎 = 0.93, 𝐶 = 24.2, taxes = 0.24. Top 1% income share from WID (n.d.). 
Tax rates from Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (n.d.). 
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Figure 9. Cultural evolution model applied to Germany 1900–2014. Model para- 
meters: 𝑎 = 0.90, 𝐶 = 19.6, taxes = 0.144, inflation = 0.071. Top 1% income share 
from WID (n.d.). Tax rates from Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (n.d.). Inflation data after 
1956 from inflation.eu and for 1924–40 from Hetzel (2002). Before 1924, an 
approximate estimate of inflation trends was constructed from various wholesale 
price indices from NBER (2001). No data was available for the 1940–56 period. 
 
ways. In one, the missing values were left as zeros. In the other, a constant value 
equal to the average inflation over 1924–present was employed. Both ways gave 
the same result: adding inflation as a second environmental variable improved the 
fit of the inequality data from 𝑟2 = 0.81 to 0.86. 
 The regression analysis is insensitive to the specific values used for the 1922 
and 1923 inflation rates, as long as they are much higher than normal inflation. 
Using one-tenth, ten, or a hundred times the 1922 and 1923 inflation values I 
estimated did not change the 𝑟2 significantly; it remained at 0.86. The main effect 
of increasing the hyperinflation values was to make the inflation coefficient (𝑞 in 
equation 4) smaller, making the effect of inflation outside of 1922–23 increasingly 
irrelevant. If the 1922–23 inflation values were reduced to values similar to those 
of other years, the improved fit over taxes alone was eliminated. Thus, inclusion of 
the hyperinflation (and its lingering cultural impact) as a discrete event into the 
model improved the fit, not inflation per se. 
 Thus, according to the model, it was the experience of hyperinflation that, along 
with taxes, affected German business and economic culture to produce the 
observed inequality patterns. German top 1% income share collapsed from 1918 
to 1925 under 20–24% tax rates, but then rose in the 1930s under 40–50% rates 
(see Figure 9). Taxes could not have been responsible for the 1920s collapse if 
higher tax rates saw an increase in the 1930s. It must have been the hyperinflation, 
which wiped out cash and debt assets, that gave rise to the sharp drop in inequality. 
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According to the model, this brief period of hyperinflation left a cultural imprint 
(as modeled by the exponential average) that continued to exert effects after the 
inflation was over. Note the difference in the 1920s and 1930s between the 
environment (dotted line) and the predicted culture (solid line) in Figure 9. The 
environment implied rising inequality immediately after 1923, peaking in 1932, 
and then a sharp decline as tax rates rose. The data shows a large drop after WWI, 
stability through the mid-1930s, a brief rise, and then decline after 1938. The 
model shows a sharp drop due to the hyperinflation followed by a period of 
recovery, with the inequality decline beginning in the late 1930s, which is a closer 
approximation to reality than the environment model (dotted line). That is, the 
cultural model was still registering some residual effects of the hyperinflation after 
it had ended. 
Discussion 
Polynomial regressions were run on the inequality data for all five countries to 
compare the fit obtained with the cultural evolution model (CEM) to that from an 
arbitrary unstructured model with the same number of parameters. The 𝑟2 values 
of 0.98 for Britain and 0.86 for Germany obtained with CEM were dramatically 
better than the 0.69 𝑟2  seen with polynomials for both countries. For the US, the 𝑟2 
of 0.83 with achieved with CEM was modestly better than the 0.76 𝑟2 obtained with 
the polynomial. The CEM 𝑟2 of 0.90 for Sweden was only marginally better than 
the polynomial 𝑟2 of 0.86, while the CEM fit for France was slightly worse (𝑟2 = 
0.88 vs. 0.90). In 80% of the cases, CEM possessed one of the basic properties of a 
good explanatory model—it did a better job of representing the data than an 
arbitrary curve-fitting model. 
 A key feature of CEM is the effect of the cultural learning variable a on the 
environmental variables of taxes, inflation and strike frequency. In the absence of 
the smoothing effect provided by the exponential average, the fits achieved with 
regression models using the environmental variables alone were worse than those 
obtained with a polynomial in 80% of the cases. This exponential average arises 
out of equation 2, which reflects the Bayesian-analog learning model employed in 
the derivation of the guided variation cultural evolution model (see Boyd and 
Richerson 1985: 95). The interaction between the environmental variables and 
inequality is mediated through culture, which was modeled with the exponential 
average. Culture was assumed as a mix of two hypothetical archetypes assumed to 
be correlated with inequality. These archetypes were not invented for use in this 
model. Rather, they reflect a preexisting concept of shareholder versus stakeholder 
capitalism and their relation to economic inequality (Ireland 2005).  
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Piketty’s Explanation for Inequality 
Piketty’s explanation for rising inequality is that return to wealth (𝑟) is greater 
than GDP growth (𝑔). This concept is developed further here into the Pikettian 
model. GDP growth can be divided into two components: growth per capita (𝑔𝑃𝐶) 
and population growth (𝑝): 
𝑔 = 𝑔𝑃𝐶 + 𝑝       (9) 
Wealth consists primarily of capital (stocks), real estate and debt assets (bonds). 
Bond return over the long run is limited by the ability of the borrower to pay it off, 
which depends on income growth, which should track economic growth as 
measured by 𝑔𝑃𝐶 . Table 2 shows data supporting the idea that bond return is 
approximately equal to 𝑔𝑃𝐶  over the long run.  
 A typical figure for real return on capital is about 5%. Piketty reports that real 
estate returns are similar. Non-debt return comes in two forms: price appreciation 
and investment earnings. The price of an asset is based on what buyers are willing 
to pay. This, in turn, is necessarily linked to their income. Ultimately the rate of 
asset price rise ought to be limited by economic growth. Figure 10 shows plots of 
American stock market index value and per capita GDP that support the idea that 
the rate at which the stock index rises over the very long run is approximately 
equal to 𝑔𝑃𝐶 . 
 With this, total return on non-debt assets can be written as: 
total return = (5% − 𝑔𝑃𝐶) (1 −
𝑇
100
) + 𝑔𝑃𝐶       (10) 
where 𝑇 is the tax rate in percent on asset income. Here it is assumed that the assets 
are rarely sold and so capital appreciation is not taxed significantly. If we assume 
that wealth is an equal mix of all three kinds of assets, total return to wealth will 
be ⅓ bond return plus ⅔ times equation 10: 
𝑟 =
1
3
𝑔𝑃𝐶 +
2
3
(5% − 𝑔𝑃𝐶) (1 −
𝑇
100
) +
2
3
𝑔𝑃𝐶   
= 𝑔𝑃𝐶 +
2
3
(5% − 𝑔𝑃𝐶) (1 −
𝑇
100
)    (11) 
Starting with Piketty’s formula for inequality, 𝑟 > 𝑔, by substituting equations 9 
and 11 for 𝑟 and 𝑔 and rearranging, the following relation is obtained: 
(3
1
3
% −
2
3
𝑔𝑃𝐶) (1 −
𝑇
100
) > 𝑝    (12) 
Using the 2% value for 𝑔𝑃𝐶  from Table 2, equation 12 becomes 
2% (1 −
𝑇
100
) > 𝑝 → 𝑇 < 100 − 50𝑝   (13) 
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Figure 10. Real S&P 500 stock index value and real per capita GDP over time. Stock 
market data from Shiller (n.d.). 
 
Table 2. Real stock and bond returns and GDP per capita (GDPPC) growth over the 
twentieth century (in %). Stock and bond returns from Dimson et al. 2002. GDPPC 
growth from Maddison Project Database (2018). 
Country Stocks Bonds GDPPC 
Australia 7.5 1.9 1.7 
Canada 7.6 2.4 2.1 
Denmark 4.6 3.3 2.1 
France 3.8 0.1 2.0 
Germany 3.6 0.3 1.9 
Japan 4.5 1.3 2.9 
Netherlands 5.8 1.5 1.9 
Spain 3.6 1.9 2.3 
Sweden 6.4 3.1 2.3 
Switzerland 5.0 3.1 1.4 
UK 5.8 2.3 1.5 
US 6.7 2.1 2.0 
Average 5.4 1.9 2.0 
 
In the absence of taxes, 𝑟 > 𝑔 will hold and inequality rise as long as population 
growth is less than 2%, which is almost always the case. Piketty notes that for a 
brief period population growth rates in the 1–1.5% range existed in various places 
in the West, during which inequality reductions were possible with tax rates in the 
25–50% range, which existed in all countries analyzed in the mid-twentieth 
century. Going forward, 𝑝 will likely be close to zero and 𝑔𝑃𝐶  less than 2%, for which 
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even confiscatory income taxes will not be enough prevent rising inequality, hence 
his call for a wealth tax (which taxes wealth appreciation as well as its earnings).  
 Note that a negative effect of tax rate on inequality falls directly out of Piketty’s 
𝑟 > 𝑔 concept. The finding that tax rate played the major role in explaining 
inequality trends in Europe is consistent with the Pikettian model. 
The Pikettian Model Does Not Explain the US Experience 
The Pikettian model effect of taxation does not involve culture. It is the same sort 
of effect of taxes shown by the portfolio analysis (red line) in Figure 4. That analysis 
can explain only some of the post-1980 rise in American inequality, however. As 
Piketty shows, perhaps half of the rise in inequality in the US since 1980 was due 
to rising labor compensation, not income from wealth. This is also illustrated by 
the trends in portfolio value and executive compensation shown in Figures 2 and 
4. Since 1980, portfolio value relative to wage doubled (Figure 4) while executive 
income adjusted for economic growth quadrupled (Figure 2), indicating a larger 
impact of labor income on inequality.  
 Although taxes directly affect wealth accumulation (historically most return 
comes from investment income, not price appreciation) they do not affect pre-tax 
labor compensation. Thus, the direct impact of taxation could not explain the 
entirety of the post-1980 American inequality rise. This is why a cultural approach 
was taken in this article. Because top 1% labor compensation did not rise in Europe 
to the extent it did in America, it is possible that cultural evolution was not a factor 
in Europe. 
Cultural Evolution Is Likely Involved in European Inequality Trends Also 
Just as rising inequality in labor compensation in the US requires an explanation, 
so does its absence in Europe. American executives were able to reap a larger com-
pensation for doing the exact same job a previous generation of executives did for 
less. Presumably, European executives would like to have achieved such lofty com-
pensation as well, particularly when their American peers were doing so. Yet they 
did not.  
 Explanations for this failure often invoke structural or cultural differences be-
tween Europe and the United States (Conyon and Murphy 2000; Derousseau 2014; 
Pollard 2012). Economic policy and business practice in Europe feature a stronger 
welfare state and a larger role for labor unions in economic and business 
management than in the US. Under German “Rhine capitalism,” labor unions 
participate in corporate governance (Kreijger 2017) while under the “Nordic 
model” in Sweden, unions run the unemployment insurance system (Mathews 
2017). Unions in France bargain at the sector level in which wages and working 
conditions are negotiated for entire industries rather than individual companies as 
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in America (Mathews 2017). French labor law is characterized by both social 
public order and employees’ protection (in order to restore “the balance of 
power”), whereas American labor law rests on the “balancing of power” by actors 
themselves. Even though working relationships are considered as contractual 
relations of private law in France, they are subjected to public-order rules intended 
to protect the weaker party of the contract (Chassagnon and Baudry 2016: 6). 
These descriptions seem similar in effect to what I presented as stakeholder 
capitalism culture in America. In fact, Piketty (2014: 145) refers to “Rhenish 
capitalism” as the stakeholder model. 
 These observations suggest that pro-worker cultural elements, for example the 
welfare state, Rhine capitalism, and the Nordic model, played a role in falling 
inequality in Europe in addition to taxes. The incorporation of a workers’ 
perspective into economic/business institutions in Europe could have provided an 
inequality-reducing influence on European cultural evolution analogous to the 
effect of strike activity in America. Tax policy packed a bigger punch in Europe than 
America; the coefficient for tax rates in the European CEMs averaged 0.19, 
compared to 0.07 for America. This cannot be due to a Pikettian effect of taxes, 
which would be about the same for all. If tax rate is considered as a proxy for pro-
worker government economic policy in parallel with the direct effect of taxes, the 
existence of pro-worker institutional structures in Europe could act as a “force 
multiplier” on the effect of tax rate in Europe.  
 Without this force multiplier, the effect of taxes was too weak to achieve 
European-scale inequality reduction effects in America without sustained strike 
activity. Without pro-worker institutions, inequality reductions in America would 
dissipate were labor to become unable to strike effectively, as happened in the 
1970s. Note how the dotted line in Figure 5 rose 60% over the four years before the 
first Reagan tax cut in 1981. With the incorporation of pro-labor elements directly 
into economic/business policy, the reduction in inequality achieved in Europe was 
harder to disrupt by political forces seeking higher inequality. As a result, the 
evolution of inequality followed a different trajectory in Europe than in America, as 
described below. 
 Inequality profiles fall into two categories: the French, Swedish and German 
inequality profiles are L-shaped (see Figures 7–9), while the American and British 
are U-shaped (see Figures 5–6). Examination of the business environments (dotted 
lines) shows the difference between the two. The dotted line for America (see 
Figure 5) began a decade-long rise in the late 1970s, reflecting the 24% drop in 
labor power during the Carter administration, followed by tax cuts and a further 
18% decline in labor power during the Reagan-Bush administrations. The dotted 
line for Britain showed a coincident rise (see Figure 6), reflecting the large tax cuts 
and privatization of nationalized industries implemented by the Thatcher 
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administration and subsequent Tory administrations. Together these achieved a 
partial recovery of inequality to pre-WWI levels. Top rates fell more gradually and 
to a lesser degree in Sweden, France, and Germany, as shown by the smaller rise in 
the dotted lines in Figures 5, 7 and 9.  
 A possibly relevant difference between the U-shaped and L-shaped countries 
was the degree to which stakeholder culture was integrated with institutions. In L-
shaped countries, stakeholder capitalism had structural components that provided 
a cultural inertia, preventing conservatives from rapidly achieving large inequality 
gains. In contrast, stakeholder culture in America and Britain was imposed on a 
largely unchanged economic/business structure by high taxes and the pro-union 
bias of the Democratic and Labour parties. In these countries, stakeholder 
capitalism would decline if the political power of pro-union parties diminished. 
Inequality gains were largest in the US, where there never had been a labor party. 
Cooperation between Democrats and organized labor had always been an alliance 
of convenience, which ended in the post-civil rights era when a pro-union stance 
became less electorally advantageous. In Britain, where unions had their own party, 
the potential for a reinvigorated Labour party may have limited the extent of 
inequality gains achievable.  
Inequality Trends among the Five Nations are Synchronous 
All five nations begin a long-term decline in inequality, known as the Great 
Compression (Goldin and Margo 1991), at about the same time: Britain in 1914, 
Sweden in 1917, France and the US in 1930, and Germany between 1918 and 1925. 
Since tax policy was an important factor in the evolution of inequality in the five 
nations examined here, it is instructive to see when substantial taxes were first 
imposed in each nation. Top rates first reached 60% or higher in Britain, France 
and the US over 1917–23. These counties were all belligerents in WWII, and raised 
their taxes because of the war. As noted earlier, Germany’s Great Compression was 
probably initiated by the 1923 hyperinflation, which was also a product of the war. 
Interestingly, France and the US did not begin their Great Compressions because of 
WWI; rather, they came later, in 1930, with the start of the Great Depression. This 
is because both countries, after raising taxes to very high levels because of the war, 
cut them dramatically afterward, from 72% to 30% in France, and 77% to 24% in 
the US. This is shown by the upsurges in the dotted line during the 1920s in these 
countries and not the others. For four of the nations examined here, the Great 
Compression was approximately synchronous because of two events that affected 
all of them: WWI and the Great Depression. Given these external factors, the 
evolution of inequality in each country can be explained by national-level factors.  
 Sweden’s Great Compression began during WWI, even though Sweden was not 
a belligerent and its tax rates did not reach 60% until two decades after the war. 
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Swedish income taxes began in 1862, before any of the other countries, and showed 
a rising trend of about 40% per decade until 1978. Sweden’s Great Compression 
appears to have been the cumulative effect of a sustained program of rising taxes, 
which led to the lowest level of inequality of all five countries analyzed. Sweden 
appears to have developed an inequality-reducing, progressive national culture 
during the period of rising taxation independent of any external factors. 
 Inequality began a rising trend in the 1970s and 1980s in all these countries 
except Germany. Synchronicity again reflected an external factor, the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system. In 1944 the leading economies agreed to operate under a 
dollar standard to replace the gold standard, which had been suspended during the 
Depression and WWII. The US dollar was to be used for settling accounts between 
nations in the same way as gold had previously been used. The dollars could still 
be converted into gold by the US Treasury, which held large supplies of the metal 
at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Although the $35/oz exchange value adopted under 
Bretton Woods was quite appropriate in 1944, the “true value” of gold in dollars 
roughly doubled in the quarter century afterward. As the discrepancy between the 
official dollar price for gold and its true value in terms of goods became too extreme 
not to notice, increasing amounts of gold were exchanged for dollar reserves 
collected by foreign central banks. The ominous decline in US gold reserves 
eventually forced President Nixon to end gold–dollar interconvertibility in 1971. 
When this happened, gold began to trade freely. By 1973 gold prices had topped 
$100. This evidence that the dollar was truly worth a fraction of what the official 
$35 gold price had implied led to a bull market in commodities (Dennin 2016). In 
this environment the OPEC oil cartel massively increased oil prices, leading to the 
1973 oil crisis and a decade of high inflation.  
 The response to the 1970s inflationary crisis was aggressive action by central 
banks to contain inflation using high interest-rate policy. Such policy works by 
slowing consumer income growth, constraining consumers’ ability to pay higher 
prices. In the US, the Republican party had long supported higher taxes, when 
necessary, to prevent government deficits because they had believed deficits led to 
inflation. With the Federal Reserve providing inflation control, there was no longer 
any need for balanced budgets and Republicans were free to cut taxes and run 
deficits. The British response was similar to that of the US: the Bank of England 
took steps to bring inflation under control and the Tories cut taxes in response. 
 Central banks in Europe played similar roles to the Federal Reserve to deal with 
the inflation problem, with the greatest success achieved by the German 
Bundesbank. Inflation rates were the lowest and subsequent tax cuts the smallest 
of the five countries examined here. As a result, Germany saw no significant rise in 
inequality from the end of postwar occupation to the 2008 financial crisis. 
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Conclusions 
The CEM provides a plausible explanation for observed trends in inequality in five 
countries over the past century. In most cases it gave a better fit of the data than a 
polynomial fit implying the CEM has a non-zero degree of explanatory power. CEM 
provides a way to combine verbal arguments invoking culture with data-driven 
assessments like that provided by Piketty (2014) to provide a more complete ac-
count of inequality trends over the past century. 
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